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Trade Organization (WTO) promotes 
the effective participation of its member 
countries in this multilateral forum.  
1. World Economic 
Situation
World economy has encountered 
difficulties in regaining the momentum it 
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GDP and World Trade trends in 2000-2019 
(annual variation rates)
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 2019 2000-
2009
 GDP 5.4 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.9
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Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook. July 2019; April, January 2019; July, October 2018.
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had reached before the subprime crisis. 
Indeed, as the end of the decade draws 
near, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and world trade are expanding at a rate 
of between 40% and 50% below the one 
observed before said crisis. The strong 
deceleration in the flow of traded goods is 
a particular cause for concern. 
In 2017, when the European Union (EU) 
seemed to be finally recovering from the 
impacts of the subprime crisis, it appeared 
as if the engines of growth could become 
aligned. In fact, for the first time since 2008, 
the United States, China, Japan and the EU 
were showing growth rates that indicated a 
possible return to global growth rates of 4%.
A recent report issued by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (July 2019) shows for 
the fourth time in 12 months a downward 
trend for world economic growth in 2019. 
Nevertheless, this process has been 
frustrated by the emergence of trade 
tensions between some of the main 
players in the world economy, as a 
result of geopolitical events and the 
potential effects of a no-deal Brexit on 
the European economy, Europe being 
a major player in world trade. This has 
led to increasing uncertainty and a 
reduced appetite for risk, which in turn 
affects investment and disturbs global 
supply chains and technologies. Within 
this context, global trade is strongly 
decelerating. After growing 5% annually 
in the first decade of the century, the end 
of the second decade shows an annual 
growth of less than 3%. 2
Going from nearly 4% forecasted 12 
months ago, the current estimated growth 
for 2019 has dropped to 3.2%, the second 
lowest value in two decades3.
2
2. Table 1 shows an annual expansion of 4.6% for the 2010-2019 period. However, this value is strongly influenced by the high 
rates of 2010 and 2011, immediately after the subprime crisis, during which there were fiscal and monetary stimulus packages 
implemented by the economies of the G20. If we consider the 2012-2019 period, international trade grew only at 2.7% annually. 
In its World Economic Outlook report of July 2019, the IMF points out that in the first quarter of 2019, world trade grew only 0.5% 
in twelve months.
3. This value only exceeds that of 2001 with the dotcom crisis, when the United States grew 0.8% and world economy grew by 2.5% 
(IMF. 2007. World Economic Outlook. April).
Table 1. Average growth rates of world economy and trade
2010-2019 2012-2019
GDP 3.7 3.5
World trade 4.6 2.7
Source: Calculations based on the IMF report. Op.cit.
During the 2000-2016 period, agricultural 
trade grew at 6% annually, showing even 
more resilience than manufactures and 
other commodities. A significant change 
observed in agricultural markets was 
the growing participation of emerging 
economies, both for exports and imports. 
2. Agriculture in the WTO
Agriculture still remains the “poor relative” 
in multilateral trade negotiations. Its 
inclusion in discussions has been sluggish 
and after decades of negotiations, 
progress remains modest. Although 
agriculture was part of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
in 1947, in practice agricultural trade was 
subject to numerous exemptions from the 
agreed upon standards, such as export 
subsidies and quantitative restrictions to 
trade. Within that time period (1947-1995) 
there were no market access negotiations, 
and as a result, the main agricultural trade 
flows were never subject to the regulations 
set forth in the GATT.  
Agriculture became part of the 
negotiations in 1995 at the Uruguay 
Round, when the GATT gave way to the 
WTO. The Agreement on Agriculture 
was thereby established, based on 
three pillars: i) market access; ii) export 
subsidies (called “export competition”) 
and other mechanisms that artificially 
raise the competitiveness of exports; and 
iii) domestic support, subsidies and other 
programs to secure prices for the producer 
and/or the income of farmers4.
The Doha Declaration, in paragraphs 13 
and 14, set forth the objectives of each 
pillar: i) “substantial improvements in 
market access; ii) reductions of, with a 
view to phasing out, all forms of export 
subsidies; iii) substantial reductions in 
trade distorting domestic support”. It also 
established special and differentiated 
treatment for developing countries in 
each of these pillars, and added that the 
specific modalities for these three pillars 
had to be defined no later than the date 
of the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference in 2003. This requirement 
was not met.
3
4. Domestic support is classified into four categories called ‘compartments’, according to their level of distortion on production and 
trade.
Table 2. Fall in global economic growth projections (for 2019 and 2020).
Conducted in July 2018 October 2018 January 2019 April 2019 July 2019
2019 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.2
2020 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook. July 2019; April, January 2019; July, October 2018.
In July 2004, the WTO General Council 
defined the “Doha Work Programme”, 
which included decisions on the three 
pillars but failed to define the parameters 
involved or the specific timeframes 
for their implementation. It did define, 
however, that in terms of domestic 
support, reductions would be enforced 
at the consolidated levels and not the 
applied ones, with which the negotiated 
reductions had to be sufficiently 
substantial in order to lower the effective 
levels of support. In the case of amber 
box support, for example, a definition 
was not found to determine a maximum 
level of support per product instead of 
an average, which would leave many 
relevant products unchanged. It also 
established, among other topics, that the 
aggregate consolidated measurement of 
the three main types of support (amber 
box, de minimis and blue box) should 
reflect a global reduction, indicating that 
countries with more domestic support 
should apply more significant reductions 
and that, from the moment the system is 
implemented, the sum of the three types 
of support should fall by at least 20%5.
The Bali and Nairobi Ministerial 
Conferences (2013 and 2015 
respectively) indicated a certain level of 
progress. In Bali, issues of food security, 
tariff quotas and export subsidies were 
addressed, in an attempt to enforce these 
measures and improve transparency 
and surveillance. In Nairobi, all member 
countries committed to eliminate export 
subsidies for agricultural products. This 
elimination was to take place gradually, 
based on the development level of each 
country: developed countries were to 
eliminate them immediately, whereas 
the least developed ones were to do 
so as of 2030. Other provisions were 
adopted, aimed at limiting the impact of 
other support measures for agricultural 
exports (loans, commercial State-owned 
companies and international food aid). 
In Nairobi, the negotiation agenda 
introduced new topics (public stocks 
for food security, the special safeguard 
for developing countries), establishing 
a preferential agreement on cotton that 
fostered market access and domestic 
support for less developed countries.        
These developments, albeit important, 
are still limited. Export subsidies had 
been falling in the previous 15 years, 
and were almost non-existent in 2012 
for the United States and, since 2013, 
for the EU6. The challenge remains how 
to enforce the measures, which have a 
similar effect on said subsidies. Issues of 
market access still fail to be addressed, 
while many distortive practices continue: 
relatively high tariffs; seasonal tariffs; tariff 
quotas; “tariff peaks” that make these 
products prohibitive; and tariff escalation 
that negatively affects the value added 
in exports from developing countries. 
In terms of domestic support, although 
the distortive aspects were reduced, 
the ceilings set remain very high and 
flexibilities persist (for instance, the de 
minimis clause), which, based on the 
size the vendors, can end up affecting 
4
5. CEI (International Economy Center, Argentina). 2005. Trade negotiations. CEI Magazine, Foreign Trade and Integration. 
November.
6. ODEPA (Office of Agrarian Studies and Policies, Chile. 2017. Perspectives for Agriculture in the WTO. Santiago, Chile.
5international prices7. At the Buenos Aires 
Ministerial Conference (2017), on the 
other hand, no progress was made on the 
agricultural issue.
3. Agriculture and other 
challenging issues for 
the WTO
In addition to the usual difficulties 
encountered when dealing with agricultural 
issues, other relevant and highly complex 
problems have emerged in the past two 
years. Apart from the traditional claims 
made by the US that the WTO litigates too 
much and negotiates too little, the country 
has further criticized the functioning of 
the Appellate Body of the WTO, claiming 
that it fails to comply with the 90 days 
established for reviewing appeals and that 
it allegedly exceeds its mandate, making 
legal interpretations that have not been 
negotiated, which, in practice, could lead 
to new commitments for the member 
countries. The United States has been 
blocking the appointment of new members 
to the Appellate Body, which could cease 
to operate due to lack of quorum as of 
next December 118.
Within the context of the trade dispute with 
China, the United States claims that the 
Asian country is failing to comply with the 
commitments it undertook upon entering 
the WTO, and that the organization is not 
acting diligently to enforce compliance on 
issues such as the role of State-owned 
companies in trade, industrial subsidies and 
the respect for intellectual property rights, 
among others9. On the other hand, several 
members of the WTO have expressed 
concern about the support programs that 
the United States has implemented for 
farmers affected by Chinese retaliation 
measures, and have requested information 
regarding whether these programs are in 
keeping with the commitments undertaken 
by the US within the WTO. 
The EU was the first to react with specific 
proposals to address key thematic areas 
in the operation of the WTO. A document 
issued by the European Commission10 
deals with industrial subsidies, the role 
of State-owned companies and barriers 
to services and investments, including 
forced technology transfers. The EU 
has also suggested different criteria to 
address flexibilities in the context of the 
developmental goals, proposing a more 
evidence-based, special and differentiated 
treatment. It also includes initiatives 
aimed at reinforcing the supervisory role 
of the WTO, improving transparency and 
notifications as well as specific reforms to 
the dispute settlement system. 
7. INTAL connection. 2017. Negotiation trends on agricultural trade. Available at https://conexionintal.iadb.org/2017/09/01/
tendencias-en-las-negociaciones-sobre-el-comercio-agricola/.
8. Senate Finance Committee. 2019. Lighthizer: Appellate Body blocks the only way to ensure reforms. InInside U.S. Trade`s, World 
Trade Online, March 12.
9. The arguments voiced by the United States can be found in the WTO document, “China`s Trade-Disruptive Model” Communication 
from the United States, General Council. July 26-27, 2018, WT/GC/W/745. The Chinese response is included in the document 
“Statement by Ambassador Dr. Zhang Xiang chen at the WTO General Council Meeting”, available at http://wto2.mofcom.gov.cn/
sys/print.shtml?/chinaviewpoints/201807/20180702770676
10. European Commission. 2018. European Commission presents comprehensive approach for the modernization of the WTO. 
Brussels, Belgium. September 18th.
6Canada presented a similar document11 
with proposals to improve the supervisory 
function of the WTO and its dispute 
settlement system, and to modernize 
the rules of trade, by adapting them to 
the challenges of the 21st century. At the 
end of November 2018, the EU and 12 
other countries submitted a proposal to 
the General Council of the WTO, aimed 
at reforming the Appellate Body, and 
which included the concerns voiced 
by the United States delegation12. This 
proposal was rejected by the United 
States, claiming that it did not reflect these 
concerns, but without stating the specific 
reasons for this rejection13.
At the end of July 2019, the EU and 
Canada agreed to create an alternative 
arbitration mechanism as a substitute to 
the WTO Appellate Body, in the event 
that the court ceased to operate after 
December 10th. This would be an interim 
body, functioning while the Appellate 
Body is reestablished or another one is 
defined to replace it. This entity would 
work under the same rules of the current 
court to address potential trade disputes 
between Canada and the EU. To this end, 
it would resort to the same arbitrators 
who performed their duties within this 
Body14. If, by the end of December, no 
decision has been made on the continuity 
of the Appellate Body, it is likely that other 
countries will gradually become part of this 
alternative system.
The US administration added new 
demands to change the functioning of the 
WTO, this time questioning the criteria 
applied for developing countries. In a 
memorandum dated late July, the White 
House questioned the fact that it was the 
same countries designating themselves 
as “developing countries”, with no agreed 
criteria on the matter15. This memorandum 
points out, for example, that 7 of the 
10 wealthiest economies (according to 
the GDP per capita measurement on a 
PPP basis) have, on different occasions, 
claimed a developing country status within 
the WTO. From the point of view of the 
US, this allows them to avail themselves of 
flexibilities in WTO rules that do not match 
their higher level of relative development. 
This would also apply to several members 
of the G20, including China.  Pursuant to 
the mentioned previously memorandum, 
the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) shall, within 90 
days of the date of the memorandum, 
and if substantial progress has not been 
made toward achieving the changes in the 
treaty, unilaterally cease to concede this 
preferential treatment on issues pertaining 
to the WTO.
11. “Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO”, Communication Document from Canada, WTO, JOB/GC/201. September 24, 2018.
12. European Commission. 2018. WTO Reform: EU proposes way forward on the functioning of the Appellate Body. European 
Commission Press Release, 26, November 2018. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6529_en.htm. The 
other 12 countries were Australia, Canada, China, South Korea, India, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and 
Switzerland.
13. Bloomberg. 2018. U.S. rejects the EU`s Trade Reform Proposal, Putting WTO at Risk. December 12. Available at https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-12/u-s-rejects-the-eu-s-trade-reform-proposal-putting-wto-at-risk.
14. Financial Times. 2019. EU and Canada agree on interim alternative to appeal court”. July 25.
15. White House. 2019. Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in WTO. July 28. Available at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-reforming-developing-country-status-world-trade-organization/.
7This measure undoubtedly creates 
additional pressure to reform this and 
other aspects of the WTO. However, 
the preferential treatment that is being 
questioned has been the norm for years 
and responds to motions agreed upon by 
all members of the WTO. The Secretariat 
of the WTO does not have the power to 
modify the agreement, unless the entirety 
of its members unanimously approves 
such an amendment. The likelihood of this 
occurring before the end of October 2019 
is quite low. 
Therefore, if moving forward with 
agricultural negotiations was not 
challenging enough, today this complexity 
has increase because two major pillars 
of the WTO structure are at stake: its 
Appellate Body and the treatment given 
to developing countries. Since the WTO 
operates with the consensus of all its 
members, it does not seem likely that 
these two obstacles will be overcome in 
the short term. 
4. Conclusions and 
proposal of key actions 
Given the scenario described, the 
governments of the region and 
agricultural companies could become 
active participants in ongoing actions 
aimed at strengthening and modernizing 
the WTO in all its functions. The time 
to criticize the functioning of the WTO 
seems to be coming to an end, to 
make way for finding solutions and 
building partnerships to strengthen and 
modernize the organization. For instance, 
there seems to be a critical mass with 
sufficient weight to move forward within a 
reasonable timeframe to resolve conflicts 
regarding the dispute settlement and 
supervisory functions.
Adapting the WTO standards to the 
challenges of the 21st century has become 
a complex task that should be addressed 
with steadfastness, yet with full awareness 
that goals will not be met in the short 
term. It does not seem adequate to tackle 
the problems of this century without 
having solved those of the previous one, 
particularly those pertaining to agriculture. 
The governments of the region and private 
agricultural organizations could strengthen 
their bonds with their peers within the 
region and in other regions in the future, 
aiming at a hemispheric and later global 
alliance that can contribute to perfect and 
renew the multilateral regulations that will 
govern trade in the decades to come. This 
seems to be the most urgent challenge. 
The more specific agricultural negotiation 
issues will probably only be dealt with 
after this reform process is completed. In 
November, in Beijing, a mini-ministerial 
meeting of the WTO will be held to 
address these challenges. The region 
must look for ways to ensure a strong 
presence in the meeting and hopefully 
submit proposals that will facilitate 
consensus on certain points. IICA could 
make a strong contribution in this regard.   
Finally, it is important to mention that 
the WTO makes an annual request 
to international inter-governmental 
organizations that have been granted 
observer status in the Agriculture 
Committee to draft a technical note on the 
actions they are carrying out with respect 
to trade and food security. These actions 
are reported back to the member countries 
of the WTO, within the framework of 
the Marrakesh Decision for Net-Food-
Importing Developing Countries. This 
information is compiled in a technical 
document presented every year during the 
last meeting of the Committee. IICA has 
drafted eight technical notes requested 
by the WTO within the framework of 
the existing partnership between both 
institutions since 201016.
For further information, please contact 
Adriana Campos Azofeifa, Manager of 
the Hemispheric Program on International 
Trade and Regional Integration of IICA at 
adriana.campos@iica.int or by calling 
(506) 2216-0170.
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16. WTO (World Trade Organization, Switzerland). 2018. Marrakesh Decision and food security: Contribution of the Inter-American 
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture in Latin America and the Caribbean (on-line). Geneva, Switzerland. Consulted on March 
28, 2019. Available at http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E.
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